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INTRODUCTION
Between 2000 and 2007, the rate of imprisonment in the United
1
States increased more rapidly than the general population. Amidst this
rapid increase in the rate of incarceration, states have been experiencing
budget deficits, which “are expected to continue, and possibly increase
2
in the coming years.” States will have to find measures that control
3
corrections costs as budget deficits continue to increase. While seeking
a solution to the faltering economy and the increasing rate of
incarceration, “some elected officials are embracing a new idea: making
inmates pay their debt to society not only in hard time, but also in cold,
4
hard cash.” Pay-to-stay programs charge inmates for the cost of their
incarceration and have been implemented in various forms to combat
decreasing corrections budgets and high incarceration rates. New
York’s proposed “Madoff Bill” and New Jersey’s similar bill, if used in
conjunction with other measures that seek to decrease the rate of
incarceration, may provide a financial solution for their respective
states, because the bills would defray the high costs of incarceration,
while promoting personal responsibility where an individual has
sufficient means. Several other states have implemented similar
programs over the past two decades that charge inmates for the cost of
their incarceration through different methods.

1

HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISONERS IN 2007 1 (2009),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p07.pdf.
2
CHRISTINE S. SCOTT-HAYWARD, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE FISCAL CRISIS IN
CORRECTIONS: RETHINKING POLICIES AND PRACTICES 2 (2009), available at
http://www.vera.org/files/The-fiscal-crisis-in-corrections_July-2009.pdf.
3
Id.
4
N.Y. Lawmaker Introduces ‘Madoff Bill,’ Aims to Charge Wealthy Prisoners,
FOXNEWS.COM(Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/08/05/ny-lawmakerintroduces-madoff-aims-charge-wealthy-prisoners/.
OF
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This Note examines the potential efficacy of the proposed pay-tostay legislation in New York and New Jersey and concludes that while
the legislation would not serve as a panacea for current problems, it has
the potential to provide a significant amount of funds to both states. Part
I describes the problem of high rates of incarceration and the associated
costs. Part II surveys the current legislation of several states and details
popular provisions of pay-to-stay legislation. Part III addresses the
effectiveness and criticisms of pay-to-stay programs. Part IV then
explains the pertinent provisions of the proposed legislation in New
York and New Jersey. Part V identifies alternative measures available to
states for addressing both high incarceration rates and decreasing
budgets. Part VI analyzes the proposed legislation and looks at the
potential efficacy of both bills. Finally, this Note concludes that New
York’s Madoff Bill and New Jersey’s S. 579 should be adopted, as they
have the potential to provide a significant source of funding to both
states.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Incarceration Rates
The incarceration rate in the United States is staggering in
comparison to other industrialized nations; incarceration per capita in
the United States is “three times more than Israel, five times more than
England, six times more than Australia and Canada, eight times more
5
than France, and over twelve times more than Japan.” In 2008, for the
first time in history, 2.3 million people, or one in every 100 adults in the
6
United States, were incarcerated. Excluding those incarcerated in jails,
the number of United States residents serving sentences in federal or
state prison accounted for one in every 198 residents as of December
7
31, 2007. Between 2000 and 2007, the rate of imprisonment in the
United States increased more rapidly than the general population; the
number of prisoners increased by 15%, with the general population
5

Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment
Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 52 (2008).
6
John Gramlich, Study Finds Disparity in Corrections Spending, STATELINE.ORG (Mar.
2, 2009), http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=380542.
7
WEST & SABOL, supra note 1, at 3. “As of December 31, 2007, there were 506
sentenced prisoners per 100,000 U.S. residents (1 in every 198 U.S. residents) up from 501
per 100,000 at yearend 2006.” Id.
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8

increasing only 6.4% during the same time period. Despite the overall
trend between 2000 and 2007, New York experienced a decrease of
sixty-two prisoners per 100,000 residents, and New Jersey experienced
9
a similar decrease of fifty-four prisoners per 100,000 residents.
The increase in the number of incarcerated individuals has led to
overcrowding in many prisons and jails. The 2000 Census of State and
Correctional Facilities conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics
concluded that while federal prisons were rated to hold approximately
10
83,000 individuals, they were holding nearly 111,000 prisoners. On
average, state prison facilities were also found to be operating in excess
11
of capacity. Citing these statistics, one author noted that “[t]his is to
say nothing of the over-crowding in hundreds of the nation’s jails that
12
are not analyzed in the Bureau of Justice Statistics.” As prisoners
challenge overcrowding through the legal system, the state experiences
13
increased costs in defending itself against these suits. Prison
overcrowding is also linked to other problems with confinement, such
as “unsanitary facilities, inadequate staffing, poor medical care,
heightened levels of tension and violence, and a higher incidence of
14
sexual assault.”
B. Costs of Incarceration
In the 2008 fiscal year, total corrections expenditures of states
15
reached nearly $52 billion. States spent approximately $47 billion of
general funds, $4 billion of special funds and bonds, and $900 million
16
of federal funds on corrections. Since 1998, the $47 billion expenditure
17
of general funds represents a massive 303% increase in spending. Total

8

Id. at 1.
Id. at 5. “[I]ndividuals under the jurisdiction of state and federal correctional
authorities.” HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2008 – STATISTICAL TABLES 21 (2009), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim08st.pdf.
10
Gershowitz, supra note 5, at 9-10.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 10.
13
Id. at 20.
14
Id.
15
SCOTT-HAYWARD, supra note 2, at 3.
16
Id.
17
Id.
9
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corrections expenditures rank as the fifth largest area of state spending
behind “Medicaid, secondary education, higher education and
18
transportation.” The past few years alone have seen a large increase in
corrections expenditures by states; in 2005, state governments made
19
direct expenditures of more than $31 billion on institutions.
The cost of housing an individual inmate varies greatly among
states and regions of the country. In fiscal year 2005, Rhode Island’s
average per inmate cost of incarceration of $44,860 was the highest in
the country, while Louisiana had the lowest average per inmate cost of
20
incarceration of $13,009. Northeastern states had an average per
inmate cost of incarceration of $35,584, while southern states had an
21
average of only $17,991 in 2005. Currently, the cost of incarceration
22
per inmate in New Jersey is over $38,700 per year. New York’s
current average per inmate cost of incarceration is in excess of $40,000
23
per year.
At least twenty-six states have responded to the national
recession by cutting their prison budgets, which was one of the fastest24
growing areas of government spending, for fiscal year 2010. These
states have made budget cuts despite the fact that the “state corrections
budgets have ballooned in the past two decades amid a surging U.S.
25
prison population.” While many states made smaller cuts in the
corrections budgets, seven states cut corrections funding by more than
26
ten percent. Kansas made the largest reported budget cut with a 22%

18
John Gramlich, At Least 26 States Spend Less on Prisons, STATELINE.ORG (Aug. 11,
2009), http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=418338.
19
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t
192005.pdf.
20
John Gramlich, Strapped States Eye Prison Savings, STATELINE.ORG (Jan. 26, 2009),
http://www.stateline.org/live/printable/story?contentId=365279.
21
Id.
22
S. 579, 2010 Sess., 214th Leg.(N.J. 2010), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/
2010/Bills/S1000/579_I1.PDF.
23
Gramlich, supra note 20.
24
Thirty-seven states responded to this survey. Gramlich, supra note 18. “The survey
did not take into account federal stimulus money, which allowed some states to blunt the
impact of their budget cuts.” Id.
25
Id.
26
“Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, and Washington – cut funding
for corrections by more than 10 percent from last year’s levels according to the study.” Id.
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27

decrease in state funding to corrections. The Vera Institute of Justice
stated that “[w]ith one in every 15 state general fund dollars now spent
on corrections, officials have little choice but to look there for savings.
In doing so, however, they must be careful to find cuts that will not
28
compromise public safety.”
C. Charging Inmates for the Cost of their Incarceration
The practice of charging inmates for the cost of their incarceration
began when Michigan adopted its State Correctional Facility
29
Reimbursement Act. Statutes requiring reimbursement to the state or
county paying the cost of imprisonment are often referred to as pay-tostay programs. In 1983, interviews with prison officials in forty-four
states revealed that the vast majority of states had exceeded their
housing capacities and many others had difficulty remaining below their
30
inmate capacity. At this time, Michigan was facing serious
31
overcrowding issues. The Michigan Corrections Commissioner asked
Governor James J. Blanchard to declare an emergency, in accordance
32
with the State’s Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act. That act
mandates the declaration of an emergency whenever the prison
population is in excess of a predetermined number for longer than thirty
33
consecutive days. It was in this context that Michigan adopted the
State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act. Since 1984, at least
twenty-four states have adopted similar programs as a means of
recouping a portion of the funds expended on incarcerating those
convicted of crimes. These programs are popular amongst taxpayers, as
they reflect the belief that “[i]nmates should be made to pay for their
34
crimes – literally.” These statutes are seen as “symbolic” and address
35
both the accountability and fiscal issues of incarceration.
27

Id.
SCOTT-HAYWARD, supra note 2, at 3.
29
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.401 (LexisNexis 2009).
30
Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, State Prisons Around Nation Scramble for Relief
as Overcrowding Mounts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1983, at A18.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
State Prisons Go After New Source of Financing: Their Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
1996, at 14.
35
Id.
28
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II. LEGISLATION
A. State Statutes
At least twenty-four states have a statute allowing for the recovery
36
of the costs of incarceration from inmates. While some statutes provide
for detailed procedures as to the assessment and collection of the costs
37
38
of incarceration, others merely authorize the practice. Further, some
39
statutes permit state recovery, while others provide for recovery by
40
counties. Still others provide for recovery by both states and counties.
Despite these differences, there are several provisions that are common
to many.
The pay-to-stay statutes can be grouped into two categories: those
41
that provide the state with a cause of action against the inmate, and
those that permit a fee to be assessed against an inmate without a

36
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-238 (LexisNexis 2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-29-506
(2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-85a (2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.485 (LexisNexis 2009);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607 (2009); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/20 (LexisNexis 2009);
IOWA CODE § 356.7 (2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265 (LexisNexis 2009); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §15:705 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341 (2009); MICH. COMP.
LAWS SERV. § 800.401 (LexisNexis 2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.831 (2009); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 53-1-107 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.2415 (LexisNexis 2009); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 30-B:19 (LexisNexis 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.56 (LexisNexis
2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 979a (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 169.151 (2007); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 41-21-905 (2009); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.019 (West 2009); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-3-201 (LexisNexis 2009); W. VA. CODE § 25-1-3a (2009); WIS. STAT. § 301.325
(2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-109 (2009).
37
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-29-506; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-85a; 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 125/20; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.403(2); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.831.
38
Kentucky allows the amount to be deducted from the inmate’s canteen account. KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265. Louisiana requires approval by the sentencing judge. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §15:705.
39
Those states providing for state recovery include: Arizona, Connecticut, Michigan,
Missouri, Texas, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-238; CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 18-85a; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.401; MO. REV. STAT. § 217.831; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 41-21-905; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.019; WIS. STAT. § 301.325.
40
Those states providing for county recovery include: Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Nevada,
and Wyoming. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341; MICH.
COMP. LAWS SERV. § 801.88; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.2415; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13109.
41
Those statutes providing a cause of action against the inmate include: ARK. CODE
ANN. § 12-29-506 (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-85a (2008); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
125/20 (LexisNexis 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.403(2) (LexisNexis 2009); MO.
REV. STAT. § 217.831 (2009).
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42

judicial proceeding. In states where the statute provides a cause of
action, the Attorney General is authorized to initiate civil proceedings,
if certain requirements are met, to recover the costs of incarceration
43
from the inmate or former inmate. Other statutes do not require a
judicial proceeding, however, the statutes may authorize the fee to be
44
deducted from the inmate’s canteen account, or may require approval
by the sentencing judge in order to seek reimbursement from the
45
inmate. A few states provide for both practices by authorizing the
deduction of costs from the assets in the possession of the correction
official or government authority, and by then permitting the institution
of a civil action if the funds available are insufficient to cover the entire
46
cost of incarceration. Some statutes specify what will be done with the
funds received as reimbursement for incarceration costs, with most
dictating that the funds go to the corrections department or facility
47
budget.
Where a recovery is not automatically permitted, many statutes
impose a time limit within which the Attorney General or the county
48
may bring the action to recover. For example, Connecticut’s statute
permits the Attorney General to bring a claim within two years of the
49
inmate’s release. Idaho imposes a one-year limitation for the county to

42

Those statutes permitting a fee to be assessed without a judicial proceeding include:
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265 (LexisNexis 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §15:705 (2009).
43
ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-29-506; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-85a; 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 125/20; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.403(2); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.831.
44
E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265.
45
E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §15:705.
46
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.56 (LexisNexis 2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 979a
(2009).
47
Seventy percent of money recovered goes to the state general fund and 30% goes to
the Attorney General’s costs. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-238 (LexisNexis 2008).
Reimbursements are credited to the justice fund or current expense fund of the county, to be
available for jail maintenance and operation purposes. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607 (2009).
Money recovered goes to the jail’s budget. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265. Twenty percent
is paid to a recovered inmate incarceration reimbursement act revolving fund, and the
remaining money goes to the department for the construction and operation of the
correctional facility. MO. REV. STAT. § 217.841. “[C]redit the moneys to the appropriate
fund established by law from which appropriations to the department are made for inmate
care and custody at the department.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-29-507.
48
Those statutes explicitly implementing a time limit for recovery include: CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 18-85a; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265.
49
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-85a (2008).
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file a claim against the former inmate for reimbursement.
Many of the statutes provide for an assessment of the inmate or
51
former inmate’s ability to pay the cost of their incarceration. Florida
assesses the inmate’s ability to pay all or a portion of the cost of his or
her incarceration, and looks to the obligations of the individual to the
52
victim and the needs of the inmate’s dependents. Under the Idaho
statute, the county investigates the financial status of the inmate by
looking at the “age, marital status, number and ages of children and
other dependents, type and value of real estate, personal property,
investments, cash, bank accounts, pensions, annuities, salary, wages,
53
other personal property.” Many statutes exclude jointly owned
54
property or assets. Other statutes mandate that “the fee must bear a
55
reasonable relationship to the offender’s ability to pay.” The
determination that an inmate has the ability to pay a certain portion is a
56
prerequisite to seeking recovery under certain statutes. At least three
states require that the Attorney General have “good cause to believe that
a prisoner has sufficient assets to recover not less than 10% of the
estimated cost of care of the prisoner or 10% of the estimated cost of
57
care for two years, whichever is less.”
Some statutes specify a maximum permitted recovery, while others
specify a method or formula for determining the amount to be assessed
58
against the inmate. Several statutes provide for the amount for each
day that may be charged as the lesser of the amount specified in the
59
statute and the actual cost of incarceration. In Maine, the fee assessed
50

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.485(LexisNexis 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607; KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265 (LexisNexis 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341
(2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.403(2) (LexisNexis 2009); MO. REV. STAT. §
217.831 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-21-905 (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-109
(2009).
52
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.485.
53
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607 (2009).
54
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 534.045.
55
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341. See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 534.045.
56
See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.403(2). See also MO. REV. STAT. § 217.831;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-21-905.
57
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.403(2) (LexisNexis 2009). See also MO. REV. STAT.
§ 217.831 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-21-905 (2009).
58
See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265 (LexisNexis 2009);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 169.151 (2007).
59
See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607 (2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265; ME. REV.
51
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by the sentencing court “may not exceed the cost of incarcerating the
60
offender or $80 per day, whichever is less.” Rather than specify a per
diem rate, many statutes require the determination of the per annum cost
by the department of corrections or commissioner of corrections, and
then prorate this amount for those individuals who are incarcerated less
61
than 334 days. Some statutes also permit recovery from inmates for the
62
cost of incarceration during the time served prior to conviction. States
may also allow for the cost of incarceration to be offset by any claim or
63
obligation that the inmate has against the state.
Finally, some statutes impose consequences for failing to comply
64
with the statute’s terms. For example, the Idaho statute does not allow
for an inmate’s term to be reduced if they have “willfully [refused]” to
65
provide information regarding their assets. Also, Florida requires that
66
inmates disclose their assets as a condition of parole. Perhaps the most
extreme statute is that of Maine, which provides that the offender must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that his failure to pay was not
the result of an “intentional or knowing refusal to obey the court’s order
or. . .a failure on the offender’s part to make a good-faith effort to
67
obtain the funds required to make payment.” Maine permits the court
to place an offender under custody, if seeking reimbursement once the
individual has been released, “until all or a specified part of the jail
reimbursement fee is paid,” but the length of confinement “may not
exceed one day for every $5 of unpaid jail reimbursement fee or 6
68
months, whichever is shorter.”

STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 134; OR. REV. STAT. § 169.151.
60
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341. See also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607; KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.265; OR. REV. STAT. § 169.151.
61
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-238.
62
See, e.g., id.
63
Id.
64
See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341 (2009).
65
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607 (2009).
66
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.485 (LexisNexis 2009).
67
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1341.
68
Id.
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B. Litigation Regarding the Statutes
1. Due Process Challenge
Missouri has one of the most comprehensive pay-to-stay statutes,
containing several provisions that have been included in the New York
69
and New Jersey bills. The Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act
70
has withstood due process challenges. Missouri v. Peterson
demonstrates the constitutionality of a cost-effective statutory provision,
and how this provision functions to prevent the state from seeking
reimbursement where such actions would be futile and a waste of state
71
resources. Petitioner was convicted of first-degree robbery in 1995,
72
and was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. He worked in the
craft room and sold his projects, and received a state payroll deposit
73
each month.
In May 2006, the Attorney General filed a petition for
reimbursement under the Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act,
which stated that the Attorney General had good cause to believe that
the state could recover at least the threshold amount, ten percent of the
74
cost of Petitioner’s care for two years. The parties agreed that ten
75
percent of the Petitioner’s cost of care for two years was $2800.
Petitioner argued that the statutory definition of assets was
unconstitutionally vague, and that because the court seized his assets
76
without a hearing, the act violated his due process rights. He also
challenged the Attorney General’s finding of good cause under section
217.831.3, asserting that the Attorney General did not have the authority
77
to file the petition for reimbursement. Examining the language of the
78
statute, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that the use of the words
69

MO. REV. STAT. § 217.827 (2009).
Missouri v. Peterson, 253 S.W.3d 77 (Mo. 2008).
71
Id.
72
Id. at 80.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 80 n.3.
76
Missouri v. Peterson, 253 S.W.3d 77, 80 (Mo. 2008).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 81. Section 217.827 states that for the Missouri Incarceration
Reimbursement Act, the term asset shall mean:
70

(1) (a) ”Assets”, property, tangible or intangible, real or personal, belonging to

ANDOLENA

2010

12/6/2010 11:58 AM

PAY-TO-STAY CORRECTIONS PROGRAMS

105
79

“wages” and “bonuses” implied “a regular employment relationship.”
The Court also found that the state payroll monthly deposits were the
only funds that qualified as a wage or bonus, and were properly
excluded from the Attorney General’s assessment of Petitioner’s
80
assets.
In response to Petitioner’s due process claim, the Court noted that
before a pre-judgment seizure, the Attorney General must have good
or due an offender or a former offender, including income or payments to such
offender from Social Security, workers’ compensation, veterans’ compensation,
pension benefits, previously earned salary or wages, bonuses, annuities,
retirement benefits, or from any other source whatsoever, including any of the
following:
a. Money or other tangible assets received by the offender as a result of a
settlement of a claim against the state, any agency thereof, or any claim against
an employee or independent contractor arising from and in the scope of said
employee’s or contractor’s official duties on behalf of the state or any agency
thereof;
b. A money judgment received by the offender from the state as a result of
a civil action in which the state, an agency thereof or any state employee or
independent contractor where such judgment arose from a claim arising from
the conduct of official duties on behalf of the state by said employee or
subcontractor
or
for
any
agency
of
the
state;
c. A current stream of income from any source whatsoever, including a
salary, wages, disability, retirement, pension, insurance or annuity benefits or
similar payments;
(b) ”Assets” shall not include:
a. The homestead of the offender up to fifty thousand dollars in value;
b. Money saved by the offender from wages and bonuses up to two
thousand five hundred dollars paid the offender while he or she was confined to
a state correctional center. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 217.827 (2009).
79
Peterson, 253 S.W.3d at 81. In determining what is considered an asset some states
have determined that the state may access gifts and windfalls of inmates or former inmates
in seeking reimbursement for the costs of incarceration. According to the press secretary for
the Attorney General in Missouri, “[g]ifts are considered assets under the statute. In many
cases, inmates received thousands of dollars in deposits, which are put into their inmate
accounts each year… Some inmates have large assets, such as retirement funds, trust funds,
annuity payments, inheritances and lottery winnings.” Trish Mehaffey, Attorneys Battle Law
Requiring Prisoners to Pay for Their Stay, DAILY RECORD (Kansas City, Mo.), July 9, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 26684687. Also, in Connecticut, “[t]he state Department of
Administrative Services has collected incarceration costs from current and former inmates
who come into what the state considers a ‘windfall’ – money received through an
inheritance, the lottery, or a legal judgment – since 2001.” Ann Marie Somma, Windfalls
Not Much Luck for Prisoners; States Will Send a Bill to Cover its Expenses, HARTFORD
COURANT, Apr. 15, 2007, at A1.
80
Peterson, 253 S.W.3d at 81-82. Section 217.827(1)(b) excludes from assets “[m]oney
saved by the offender from wages and bonuses up to two thousand five hundred dollars paid
the offender while he or she was confined to a state correctional facility.” Id. at 80.
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cause to believe that the offender has sufficient assets, and that the
court is then required to issue an order to show cause regarding why the
82
petition should not be granted to the Attorney General. This process
provides the offender with notice and the opportunity to challenge the
83
petition. The Court stated that “the fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a
84
meaningful manner,’” and found that the statutory procedures provided
85
adequate due process to offenders. Finally, in response to the argument
that the Attorney General did not have the authority to file the petition,
the Court noted that the “good cause to believe” requirement is a
condition precedent that must be met in order for the Attorney General
86
to have the authority to seek reimbursement. The Court noted that the
good cause requirement is not intended as a defense to a petition for
offenders, but rather is “intended as a cost-effective limitation on the
87
attorney general’s authority.” An offender is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether there is good cause if the offender is able
88
to raise a factual issue regarding the presence of the requisite assets.
III. PAY-TO-STAY PROGRAMS
A. Effectiveness of Current Programs
Many states and counties have recovered large sums of money
89
from inmates as reimbursement for the costs of their incarceration. For
example, under the Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act, the

81

Id. at 82 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 217.837.2).
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. (quoting Jamison v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 405 (Mo. 2007) (en
banc)).
85
Missouri v. Peterson, 253 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Mo. 2008).
86
Id. (citing State ex rel. Nixon v. Watson, 204 S.W.3d 716, 720 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006);
State ex rel. Nixon v. Koonce, 173 S.W.3d 277, 283-85 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)).
87
Peterson, 253 S.W.3d at 83 (citing Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 720; Koonce, 173 S.W.3d
at 283-85).
88
Id. at 83-84.
89
Missouri collected more than $5.3 million between 1993 and 2007. Mehaffey, supra
note 79. Connecticut collected $5 million between 2001 and April 2007. Somma, supra note
79. Macomb County, Michigan recovered nearly $1.5 million in 2003 alone. Fox
Butterfield, Many Local Officials Now Make Inmates Pay Their Own Way, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 2004, at A1.
82
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90

State collected more than $5.3 million between 1993 and 2007. In
2006 alone, the Missouri Attorney General’s office collected $757,862
from state inmates as reimbursement to the state for the cost of their
91
incarceration.
Under Michigan’s Prisoner Reimbursement to the County Act,
Macomb County, Michigan, which charges inmates for room and board
“on a sliding scale of $8 to $56 a day, depending on ability to pay,”
92
collected nearly $1.5 million in 2003 alone. In addition, Hillsborough
County, Florida recently adopted a daily subsistence fee of $5 per day
and has added a charge of $50 per day for those inmates who have been
93
convicted of a crime and are serving time in jail. Police Commissioner
Kevin Beckner believes that these new measures could raise as much as
94
$5.6 million assuming a collection rate of 80%. Further, Connecticut,
which collects its reimbursement fees from inmates’ windfalls, collected
$5 million between 2001 and April 2007, with the Connecticut
Department of Administrative Services collecting $1.9 million in 2006
95
alone.
96
Despite administrative costs, pay-to-stay programs collect a
significant amount of money for the states and counties that implement
them. Although the money that such programs bring in may be small in
comparison to a jail or prison’s annual operating cost, the programs are
97
also popular with the public. Sheriff Mark Hackel of Macomb County,
Michigan said “[w]hy should we as taxpayers have to pay the whole

90

Mehaffey, supra note 79. Missouri Department of Corrections reported an estimated
inmate cost per year of $14,000. Id.
91
Nixon Gets $757,862 From State Inmates, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, Dec. 20,
2006, at 1B. Under the Missouri statute, the Attorney General has a cause of action to obtain
a judgment against the offender for the cost of their incarceration if they have good cause to
believe the recovery will be above certain threshold levels. MO. REV. STAT. § 217.831
(2009).
92
Butterfield, supra note 89.
93
Bill Varin, Jail Inmates May Pay More For Stay, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 17,
2009, at 5B.
94
Id. Due to the fact that the $50 daily fee could cost some inmates approximately
$18,000, as many jail inmates are serving sentences of just under one year for
misdemeanors. Id.
95
Somma, supra note 79.
96
Butterfield, supra note 89. The Macomb County, Michigan program costs $120,000
per year to administer. Id.
97
Id.
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cost of incarcerating these people who break the law?” The
Jacksonville Sheriff, John Rutherford, expressed a similar sentiment,
stating that although the money collected will “only put a dent” in his
budget, “the general public will appreciate the fact [that] inmates will be
99
made to pay some of their own way.”
B. Criticism of Pay-to-Stay Statutes
Many opponents of pay-to-stay statutes criticize the laws as
ineffective because the inmates from whom reimbursement is sought are
100
often poor. The ACLU’s National Prison Project has criticized pay-to101
stay statutes as ineffective. The National Prison Project believes that
since “[t]he overwhelming number of people who end up in prison are
102
poor,” pay-to-stay programs rarely are profitable.
Another criticism of pay-to-stay statutes is that the funds sought
103
are difficult to collect. In Overland Park, Kansas, officials only collect
98

Id.
Tia Mitchell, Sheriff: Make the Inmates Pay More; Rutherford Suggests a $2
Subsistence Fee for Incarceration Costs, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, May 27, 2008, at A1.
100
See Butterfield, supra note 89. Stating that:
[T]he fees raise thorny ethical and constitutional issues, say advocates for
prisoners rights and some other corrections experts. The costs place an unfair
burden on a population that is almost by definition impoverished, making it
harder for inmates to get back on their feet after release, some groups argue.
Others contend that the fees deprive inmates of due process or constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. In a few cases, courts have sided with the inmates of
specific issues.
Id. Due to rising “clearance rates (‘the fraction of crimes cleared by arrest’)” and sentencing
practices during the 1980s and 1990s, “about one and a half million more people were
locked up in 2000 than in 1980. Such individuals are poor by any standard. Furthermore,
their income – for the most part no more than a few dollars a day—place them very far
fellow the poverty line.” Ian Irvine & Kuan Xu, Crime, Punishment, and the Measurement
of Poverty in the United States, 1979-1997 2 (Dalhousie University Economics Working
Paper, June 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=423220.
101
N.Y. Lawmaker Introduces ‘Madoff Bill,’ Aims to Charge Wealthy Prisoners,
FOXNEWS.COM (Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/08/05/nylawmaker-introduces-madoff-aims-charge-wealthy-prisoners/.
102
Id. (quoting Elizabeth Alexander, ACLU’s National Prison Project director).
103
See Butterfield, supra note 89. Stating that:
[C]ollecting fees is also an entirely different matter from levying them. Some
places profess so much difficulty that they have concluded the administrative
costs outweigh the benefits. Even if the programs bring in revenue, there may
be other costs. “The simple, stark truth is that most inmates are not drug
kingpins with lots of assets,” said Richard Blumenthal, the Connecticut attorney
99
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104

39% of the fees that they are owed. Officials in Jackson County,
Missouri, found that they were expending more money in their efforts to
105
collect the fees than they were able to collect. Further, where counties
merely attempt to collect their fees by taking money from inmates’
commissary funds, inmates are able to avoid being charged for the cost
106
of their incarceration by not depositing any money into their accounts.
Critics also accuse pay-to-stay programs of placing the burden on
107
the wrong people. Oftentimes, friends and family members of inmates
are left holding the bill in addition to, or in lieu of, the inmates
108
themselves. These programs “[place] an additional financial burden
upon families already deprived of a wage-earner, especially where these
family members, as taxpayers, are already subsidizing the cost of
109
incarceration.” This criticism likely resonates best in states or counties
that collect fees from the inmate’s prison or jail account because it is the
110
families of inmates that often make deposits into these accounts.
Still other opponents of pay-to-stay statutes argue that the
111
programs are not rehabilitative. Since the programs may potentially
burden a recently released inmate with a significant amount of debt,
such inmates may feel pressure to resort to criminal activity in order to

general. “In some cases, seizing assets may be counterproductive because it will
interfere with their rehabilitation.”
Id.
104

N.Y. Lawmaker Introduces ‘Madoff Bill,’ Aims to Charge Wealthy Prisoners, supra
note 101.
105
Id.
106
See Butterfield, supra note 89. According to one person, who was sentenced to jail
for thirty days, “I don’t put any money into my account, because they will just take it. . . I
think this system is unjust, because the judge has already given us our sentence, and the fees
are on top of that.” Id.
107
Particularly in states where fees are periodically collected from an inmate’s prison
account, the burden of these statutes falls on the wrong parties, as “[i]t’s the spouses,
children and parents who pay the fees. They are the people who contribute to the prisoners’
canteen accounts.” N.Y. Lawmaker Introduces ‘Madoff Bill,’ Aims to Charge Wealthy
Prisoners, supra note 101.
108
Id.
109
Joshua Michtom, Note, Making Prisoners Pay for Their Stay: How a Popular
Correctional Program Violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 187, 201
(2004).
110
N.Y. Lawmaker Introduces ‘Madoff Bill,’ Aims to Charge Wealthy Prisoners, supra
note 101
111
See Michtom, supra note 109, at 201.
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relieve themselves of the burden. According to Richard Blumenthal,
the Connecticut Attorney General, “[t]he simple, stark truth is that most
inmates are not drug kingpins with lots of assets. . . In some cases,
seizing assets may be counterproductive because it will interfere with
113
their rehabilitation.”
IV. PENDING LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY
A. New York’s Madoff Bill
Sponsored by New York State Assemblyman Jim Tedesco on June
114
23, 2009, New York’s Madoff Bill would require inmates with
115
sufficient financial means to pay for the costs of their incarceration.
Proposed Section 601-e would be entitled “Reimbursement for Costs of
Imprisonment,” and proposed Subdivision 1 explains that the expense
116
of imprisonment is to be borne by the inmates. Under the bill, each
inmate is subject to reimburse the state a specified portion of the cost of
117
his incarceration. This schedule looks to the inmate’s total assets to
determine his liability to the state’s Department of Corrections, and
creates a sliding scale dictating that an inmate owes a higher percentage
of the cost of his or her incarceration the higher the amount of their total
118
assets. Under the proposed schedule, an inmate who has total assets of
$200,000 or more would be responsible for 100% of the cost of his or
her incarceration, and an inmate who has total assets of less than
119
$40,000 would not be responsible for any of the cost.
The bill excludes from an inmate’s “total assets” the value of his or
120
her home or equity therein. Child support and mortgage payments are
121
also protected from consideration.
112

Id.
Butterfield, supra note 89.
114
Assemb. 09055, 232nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=+A09055%09%09&Memo=Y.
115
N.Y. Assemb. 09055.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
M.J. Stephey, Making Prisoners Pay – Literally, TIME, July 22, 2009, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1912065,00.html.
113
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The purpose of the legislation is to:
. . .[E]liminate situations where taxpayers are forced to pay costs
associated with incarcerating well-off criminals. Taxpayers should
not be stuck with the bill housing well-off criminals that are often are
able to return to their opulent lifestyles once they are released.
Forcing wealthy criminals to pay the costs associated with their
incarceration will act as a deterrent and will prevent the
inappropriate use of taxpayer funds in our prisons. . . This bill will
hold criminals accountable for their actions while taking the fiscal
122
burden off our taxpayers.

In the justification for the bill, Assemblyman Tedisco explained
that the “recent incident” in Tombs prison, where the prison was “used
as a social club for parties hosted by wealthy inmates and their
123
connected friends,” demonstrates the necessity for this legislation. The
justification states that the proposed legislation would “hold criminals
accountable for their actions while taking the fiscal burden off our
124
taxpayers.” In addition to the Tombs Prison bar mitzvah being an
impetus for the bill, Assemblyman Tedisco said that he has “been
considering the bill for a long time, [and] called convicted Ponzi
schemer Bernard Madoff’s 150-year sentence in federal prison the
125
‘tipping point.’” Wealthy drug dealers are an additional target of the
122

Assemb. 09055, 232nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=+A09055%09%09&Memo=Y.
123
Id. In December 2008, at Tombs Jail in Downtown Manhattan, Tuvia Stern, an
inmate in the detention center, hosted an extravagant, 60-person Bar Mitzvah celebration for
his son. Stern, who was convicted of fraud, hosted the celebration from prison, “featuring a
Kosher caterer on china plates and a live band.” New York Assemblyman Proposes ‘Madoff
Bill’ to Punish Wealthy Inmates, FOXNEWS.COM (July 21, 2009) (on file with author).
Tombs houses approximately 20,000 inmates each year and “is the largest receiving area in
the country,” with “[m]ore than 500 corrections officers supervise some 850 inmates.”
Harriet Ryan, History Haunts Manhattan’s Tombs Jail, CNN.COM (Dec. 31, 2002),
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/12/31/ctv.tombs/.
124
N.Y. Assemb. 09055.
125
New York Assemblyman Proposes ‘Madoff Bill’ to Punish Wealthy Inmates, supra
note 123.
A Ponzi scheme is an investment fraud that involves the payment of purported
returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Ponzi
scheme organizers often solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in
opportunities claimed to generate high returns with little or no risk. In many
Ponzi schemes, the fraudsters focus on attracting new money to make promised
payments to earlier-stage investors and to use for personal expenses, instead of
engaging in any legitimate investment activity.
Ponzi Schemes – Frequently Asked Questions, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
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proposed legislation.

B. New Jersey Bill
On May 7, 2009, State Senator James Beach (Camden) introduced
NJ Legislative Bill S. 2809 that requires “certain inmates to pay the cost
127
On May 18, 2009, Assemblywoman Dawn
of their incarceration.”
Marie Addiego (Burlington) and Assemblyman Scott Rudder
(Burlington) introduced an identical bill, NJ Legislative Bill A3964, in
128
the State Assembly. Then on January 12, 2010, Assemblywoman
Addiego and Assemblyman Rudder introduced the exact same bill in
129
the State Assembly, NJ Legislative Bill A1180. On the same day, State
Senator Beach introduced an identical bill in the State Senate, NJ
130
Legislative Bill S. 579.
Under the proposed legislation, the Commissioner of Corrections is
responsible for establishing and collecting a fee to cover the costs of
confinement for every year that an inmate is in the custody of the
131
Department of Corrections. The amount of the fee collected is the
average cost of incarcerating an inmate for one year, which is to be
132
prorated for people incarcerated for 334 days or less. The amount of
133
the fee includes “time served prior to conviction” as well. The
Commissioner will also establish and collect this fee for inmates in
halfway houses and “similar private nonprofit community based
134
residential treatment centers.”
In assessing whether to impose a fee on a particular inmate, state
officials gather information from the pre-sentencing investigation report
http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
126
Stephey, supra note 121.
127
S. 2809, 2009 Sess., 213th Leg. (N.J. 2009), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us
/2008/Bills/S3000/2809_I1.PDF.
128
Assemb. 3964, 2009 Sess., 213th Leg. (N.J. 2009), available at http://www.njleg.
state.nj.us/2008/Bills/A4000/3964_I1.PDF.
129
Assemb. 1180, 2010 Sess., 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/A1500/1180_I1.PDF. The bill was reintroduced as it
was a new legislative session.
130
S. 579, 2010 Sess., 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us
/2010/Bills/S1000/579_I1.PDF.
131
N.J. S. 579(1)(a).
132
Id. at (1)(b).
133
Id.
134
N.J. S. 579.
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135

and the findings and orders of the sentencing court. This information
136
is used to determine the inmate’s assets, liabilities, and dependents. If
the inmate’s financial situation changes from the time of the report,
[T]he commissioner shall have the discretion to waive the fee or
impose a lesser fee if the inmate demonstrates to the commissioner’s
satisfaction: (1) that the inmate is unable to pay the fee and is
unlikely to become able to pay; or (2) that the imposition of the fee
137
would unduly burden the inmate’s dependents.

The proposed legislation provides that the fees collected can be
138
used towards alcohol and drug abuse prevention programs. According
to State Senator James Beach, “[m]any of those behind bars are there as
a direct or indirect result of drug abuse, and I believe that the money
collected could be put to better use to help fund substance abuse
139
programs that may help decrease the rate of recidivism.”
As the means of collection, the State will have a lien against the
140
inmate’s property and income for the amount of the fee. Importantly,
the proposed legislation allows for those people either directly or
indirectly affected by the lien to bring an action against the State in the
141
county in which the lien was filed in order to challenge its validity.
Once this process is complete, the entry will have “the same force and
142
effect as a civil judgment” and the State will have “all the remedies
and may take all of the proceedings for the collection thereof which
may be had or taken upon the recovery of a judgment in action, but

135

Id. at (1)(c).
Id.
137
Id. at (1)(d).
138
Id. at (1)(e).
139
James Beach & James W. Holzapfel, Criminals Should Cover the Cost of Their
Imprisonment, ALLBUSINESS, July 20, 2009, http://www.allbusiness.com/government
/elections-politics-politics-political-parties/12601658-1.html.
140
S. 579(2)(a), 2010 Sess., 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010), available at http://www.njleg.
state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S1000/579_I1.PDF. In order to establish the lien, the State Treasurer
or commissioner is to issue a certificate that identifies the person who is indebted to the
clerk of the Superior Court, and “the clerk shall immediately enter upon the record of
docketed judgments the name and date of birth of such inmate as debtor; the State as
creditor; the address of such inmate if shown in the certificate; the amount of the debt so
certified; a reference to the statute under which the debt is assessed; and the date of making
such entries.” Id. at (2)(b).
141
Id. at (2)(f).
142
Id. at (2)(b).
136
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without prejudice to any right to appeal.” In addition, post-judgment
interest may accrue from the date of docketing the certificate, if not
144
waived by the State Treasurer. Further, if the debt remains unpaid, and
if the State Treasurer makes further collection efforts, a fee will be
145
imposed in the amount of the greater of 20% of the debt or $200. In
order to discharge the lien, the State Treasurer or his agent must file a
certificate with the clerk of the Superior Court stating that the lien
146
should be discharged.
The State Treasurer is authorized to
compromise for the settlement of the amount of a lien for the costs of an
147
inmate’s confinement.
V. ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO ADDRESS THE BUDGET
DECREASE AND/OR HIGH INCARCERATION RATE
A. Jail and Prison Closures
Several states have considered closing prisons as a means of
148
decreasing their expenditures in light of the national recession. As of
2009, Colorado, Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North
149
Carolina and Washington had at least considered closing prisons. In
addition, at least twenty-two states have “reduced beds, halted
150
expansions, or delayed the opening of new facilities.” The ability to

143

Id.
Id.
145
The State Treasurer can refer the matter to the Attorney General. Id.
146
S. 2809(2)(d), 2009 Sess., 213th Leg. (N.J. 2009), available at http://www.njleg.
state.nj.us/2008/Bills/S3000/2809_I1.PDF.
147
Id.
148
John Gramlich, Tracking the Recession: Prison Economics, STATELINE.ORG (June 1,
2009), http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=403563.
149
Gramlich, supra note 18. By July 2009, Michigan had closed two prisons and one
prison camp and has plans to close an additional three prisons and five prison camps in
fiscal year 2010. New York has plans to close three minimum security prisons and parts of
seven other facilities. SCOTT-HAYWARD, supra note 2, at 6-7. Since the fall of 2008,
Washington has closed or has plans to close five units at different facilities. Press Release,
Dep’t of Corr. Wash. State, DOC Announces Additional Prison Unit Closures and Delayed
Openings (June 2, 2009), available at http://www.doc.wa.gov/news/pressreleases
/2009/060209DOCAnnouncesAdditionalPrisonUnitClosuresandDelayedOpenings.asp.
In
2009, New Jersey closed a Camden prison that held more than 1000 prisoners. N.J. To Close
Camden’s Riverfront State Prison, CBS 3, http://cbs3.com/local/Riverfront.State.Prison.
2.909382.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2010).
150
SCOTT-HAYWARD, supra note 2, at 6-7.
144
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take such actions in an effort to reduce corrections expenditures is
limited to those states that have been able to lower their prison
151
populations through policy reforms.
In New York, prison closures have been implemented in an attempt
to decrease the more than $16 million budget gap, which is partially due
152
to “staggering revenue losses” following the collapse of Wall Street.
With the hopes of saving more than $50 million over the next two fiscal
years, New York has plans for the complete closure of three minimumsecurity correctional camps, and the partial closure of seven additional
153
facilities. The State will move the inmates expected to be displaced by
these closures, a total of 670 inmates, to other facilities with open
154
beds. Because of the potential for job loss, unions representing prison
employees and the communities in which the facilities are located have
155
opposed these closures.
B. Reducing Guard to Inmate Ratio
Another measure taken by some corrections systems to reduce
156
expenditures is the reduction of the guard to inmate ratio. However,
this practice is potentially dangerous to both the inmates and the

151

Id. Policy reforms that can work to reduce prison populations include improving
community supervision, reducing recidivism, and accelerating prison releases. Id. at 7-10.
152
Gramlich, supra note 148.
153
SCOTT-HAYWARD, supra note 2, at 6-7, 9. The Sullivan Annex, a minimum security
prison in upstate New York is one of the closures. Gramlich, supra note 148. New York
State has closed the following minimum-security correctional facilities: Mt. McGregor
(Saratoga County), Pharsalia (Chenago County), Gabriels (Franklin County). New York
State has plans to close the following Annexes: Butler Minimum (Wayne County –
minimum security), Eastern Annex (Ulster County – medium security), Green Haven Annex
(Dutchess County – medium security), Groveland Annex (Livingston County – minimum
security), Lakeview Annex (Chautauqua County – medium security), Sullivan Annex
(Sullivan County – minimum security), Washington Annex (Washington County - medium
security). Fact Sheet: 2009 Prison Closures, NEW YORK ST. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES, http://www.docs.state.ny.us/FactSheets/PrisonClosure09.html (last visited Aug.
29, 2010).
154
Gramlich, supra note 148. A spokesman for the New York State Department of
Correctional Services explained, “[w]e are like everybody else. We have to cut back. We
just don’t have the money…these are different times, and this is a big crisis that we face.”
Id.
155
Id.
156
See Kim Shayo Buchanan, Commentary, It Could Happen to “You”: Pay-To-Stay
Jail Upgrades, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 60, 60 (2007).
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remaining guards of the facilities. In Los Angeles County, inmates are
so densely packed in their cells that they must remain in their bunks at
158
all times, causing routine assault and rape. In 2006, amidst these
terrible conditions, funding cutbacks led to a reduction in the guard-toinmate ratio to approximately one guard per 1000 inmates, as compared
159
to the national average of one guard per ten inmates. In these dire
conditions, “overburdened jail administrators and staff may feel there is
160
little they can do to prevent the violence.” Further, the Commission on
Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons identifies several conditions that
are likely to result in violence: “overcrowding, idleness, inadequate
security classification, lack of direct supervision by staff, and a nearcomplete absence of recreational activities and rehabilitative
161
programs.” Although a possible means to reduce expenditures, the
potential increase in violence may outweigh the utility of this
expenditure-reduction measure.
C. Releasing Prisoners
Several states have responded to overwhelming incarceration rates
162
by releasing prisoners early. These measures are controversial and
some believe that early releases, as well as other cost-cutting measures,
163
have the potential to threaten public safety. Furthermore, when
released prisoners recidivate, public outrage and reviews of corrections
164
policy often result.
For instance, in 2008 a paroled Pennsylvania man fatally shot a
165
police officer within a month of his release. As a result of this crime,
Governor Ed Rendell “temporarily [halted] the parole process to
157

See generally Matthew Harwood, Prison Overcrowding Jeopardizes Guard and
Inmate Safety, SECURITY MANAGEMENT (July 21, 2009), http://www.securitymanagement
.com/news/panel-prison-overcrowding-jeopardizes-guard-and-inmate-safety-005904
(explaining that overcrowding and reduced guard to inmate ratios increases the level of
violence experienced by both groups).
158
Buchanan, supra note 156, at 60.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. (emphasis added).
162
Alabama, California, Kentucky, and North Carolina are among the states that have
released prisoners early in recent years. Gramlich, supra note 18; Gramlich, supra note 20.
163
Gramlich, supra note 18.
164
Gramlich, supra note 20.
165
Id.
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166

conduct a ‘top-to-bottom review;’” however, the review found that the
167
prisoner had been properly released. At least eight states in the last
year have considered or approved the practice of releasing prisoners
early, and some states, including Alabama and North Carolina, have
approved the release of elderly or terminally ill inmates, whose health
168
care while incarcerated costs taxpayers millions of dollars. At least
thirty-four other states have approved compassionate releases of
169
inmates who pose little threat to the public. Early release programs are
highly criticized when it is found that a large number of those released
commit new crimes. For example, the prisoner release program in
Kentucky was criticized when it was reported by a newspaper that “at
least [fourteen] percent of those released were accused of committing
new crimes within months,” despite the fact that national recidivism
170
rates are generally much higher.
D. Sentencing Alternatives
1. Community Courts
The Community Court system is one measure that New York has
171
taken as an alternative to traditional incarceration. In 1994, New York
began the Midtown Community Court in the Manhattan Theater
District, which focused on “quality-of-life crimes,” such as shoplifting,
172
vandalism, and prostitution. This innovative program was successful
and over the past fifteen years, the State has started seven additional
173
Community Courts. Judge Judith S. Kaye identified three core
166

Id.
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id. A compassionate release is the release of an elderly or terminally ill inmate. Id.
170
Gramlich, supra note 20.
171
The Honorable Judith S. Kaye, Lecture, Frank M. Coffin Lecture on Law and Public
Service: Shaping State Courts for the New Century: What Chief Judges Can Do, 61 ME. L.
REV. 355, 361-62 (2009).
172
Id.
173
Id. at 362. As of January 1, 2009, there were seven operational Community Courts:
Midtown Community Justice Center (New York, NY), Harlem Community Justice Center
(New York, NY), Bronx Community Solutions (Bronx, NY), Red Hook Community Justice
Center (Brooklyn, NY), Babylon Community Court (Lindenhurst, NY), Hempstead
Community Court (Hempstead, NY), and Syracuse Community Court (Syracuse, NY).
Community Courts, NEW YORK ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://www.nycourts.gov/courts
/problem_solving/cc/courts.shtml (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
167
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elements of the eight Community Courts in New York. First, each
court has “a dedicated judge in the leadership role of judicial
decisionmaker and convener of all the collaborators necessary to assure
maximum information and maximum opportunity for a meaningful
175
resolution.” Next, offenders plead guilty and then receive sentences
that are “designed to help restore the neighborhood harmed by the
176
offense.” Finally, in all of the Community Courts, there is additional
help for offenders, including drug treatment, mental health assistance,
177
and interview training and employment services. Programs like New
York’s Community Courts, which sentences offenders to revitalize the
neighborhoods that they harmed with their illegal behavior, are an
important way to divert certain offenders from the corrections system.
This program focuses on rehabilitation, by providing drug, mental
health, and employment services.
2. Drug Programs
Drug courts and substance-abuse programs are important
178
rehabilitative programs enabling some inmates to avoid incarceration.
Although states must respond to the national recession by decreasing
their expenditures, programs that seek to rehabilitate offenders should
not be cut or face reductions in funding, as these programs attempt to
179
decrease expenditures related to incarceration. Unfortunately, the
budget crisis has necessitated cuts to substance abuse programs for
180
former offenders in New York City.
In addition to substance-abuse programs, all fifty states provide the
opportunity for drug users “to avoid jail time if they meet rigorous
174

Kaye, supra note 171, at 362.
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
See Gramlich, supra note 20 (explaining that if drug users meet certain standards,
they may be able to avoid serving time in jail).
179
Given the economic crisis and the states’ budget problems, C. West Huddleston III,
executive director of the National Association of Drug Court Professionals, fears that drug
courts will face decreased funding despite their success: “My experience in the last decade
of working in policy is that, pretty much 100 percent of the time, drug dependent offenders
are at the end of the line when it comes to funding priorities… It is my fear that in these lean
times…legislatures [might] see drug court as just an extra expense on the books that they
can cut to save money.” Gramlich, supra note 20.
180
Id.
175

ANDOLENA

2010

12/6/2010 11:58 AM

PAY-TO-STAY CORRECTIONS PROGRAMS

119

181

sobriety and other conditions set by a judge.” These programs are
successful in reducing the incarceration rate and corrections
expenditures, as “[m]ore than 70 percent of those who participate in
182
drug courts avoid incarceration.” Currently, New York has 170 drug
treatment courts, some of which are in the family courts, offering
“parents the chance for early reunification with their children if they
step up to end their drug habit, and offer drug-addicted juvenile
183
offenders a chance to get back on course.”
3. Sentencing Reform
Sentencing reform is another alternative that many states have
implemented as a way to decrease the incarceration rate, and therefore,
corrections expenditures. Advocates of sentencing reform “support
curtailing or eliminating mandatory-minimum sentences and want to
change other policies, such as ‘truth in sentencing,’ that restrict parole
opportunities for many offenders” in order to prevent the nation’s
184
incarceration rate from continuing to rise. According to The
Sentencing Project, which advocates for sentencing law changes as a
means to reduce incarceration rates, the incarceration rate will continue
to increase “unless criminal penalties are reduced, even for felons
185
serving 20 years or more.”
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created guidelines to properly
determine sentences, however, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“the
186
Guidelines”) established minimum sentences for every federal crime.
Since the goal of the Guidelines is “‘objective’ sentencing, the relevant
criteria were often quantitative, taking minimal account of the
187
individuality, background or capability of the defendant.” Under the
Guidelines, sentencing ranges increased if the defendant had a “criminal
188
history.” The ranges for violations of drug laws resulted in sentences
that were considerably higher than those prior to the implementation of
181

Id.
Id.
183
Kaye, supra note 171, at 363.
184
Gramlich, supra note 20.
185
Id.
186
Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer, Lecture, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge’s
Perspective – 2002, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 11, 15 (2003).
187
Id.
188
Id.
182
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189

the Guidelines. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and its “truth-insentencing slogan,” limited “the power of the sentencing judge to
consider many factors personal to the individual, such as family
responsibilities, military service, education or the lack of it, job
opportunities, demonstrable remorse or none, mental deficiencies short
190
of insanity, and the individual’s capacity for rehabilitation.”
191
In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court held that
mandatory adherence to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the
Sixth Amendment, and the Court stated that a defendant has the right to
192
have every fact that is relevant to his punishment found by a jury. A
plurality of the Booker Court held the Guidelines to be advisory, and as
such, opined that reasonableness was the appropriate standard for the
193
appellate review of sentences. The reduction of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines from mandatory to optional or advisory is an important step
in decreasing incarceration rates. This allows judges to assess each
individual offender to determine whether he is a threat to society, and as
such, must be incarcerated, or whether more intermediate types of
194
punishment would be appropriate in the given situation.
E. California’s Pay-to-Stay Jails
Approximately fifteen municipalities in Los Angeles and Orange
Counties in California have implemented pay-to-stay jails, which
provide inmates with the option of paying between $75 and $175 per
night to serve their sentences “in a safer environment, away from the
195
chaotic county jails.” These jails are run by the municipalities and
exist in addition to the jails where inmates typically serve their
196
197
sentences. This creates a “two-tiered jail system.” As a result,
189

Id.
Id. at 16.
191
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
192
Michelle Reiss Drab, Comment, Constitutional Law: Fact or Factor: The Supreme
Court Eliminates Sentencing Factors and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 57 FLA. L.
REV. 987, 993 (2005); Kathleen H. Morkes, Note, Where Are We Going, Where Did We
Come From: Why the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Were Invalidated and the
Consequences for State Sentencing Schemes, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 249, 250-51, 272
(2006).
193
Morkes, supra note 188, at 250-51.
194
See generally Oberdorfer, Lecture, supra note 182, at 16.
195
Buchanan, supra note 154, at 60-61.
196
Buchanan, supra note 156, at 61.
190
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inmates must pay in order to be housed in a safer environment. These
199
programs are virtually marketed to the public. Advertisements in
police stations inform individuals that they can “[s]erve [their] time in
200
our clean, safe, secure facility!” In addition, “[t]he pay-to stay upgrade
is pitched to the public as a privilege for basically decent people who
201
have run afoul of the law.” Although purportedly based on the nature
of the crime or ability to pay, offenders who are permitted to serve their
202
time in pay-to-stay jails have to pass a screening interview.
This type of program raises serious concerns about fairness and
equality, and such concerns may outweigh the program’s utility. Under
such a scheme, two identical defendants could experience disparately
different treatment in the criminal justice system based on their ability
to pay. “Paying to stay is likely not an option for almost 90% of inmates
in jail, including the 59% of inmates who earned less than $1,000 per
203
month before their arrest and the 29% who were unemployed.”
Serious fairness and equality concerns are raised, as “there is no
principled basis on which a low-income drunk driver, drug dealer, or
batterer ‘deserves to have [his] safety threatened’ in a way his wealthier
204
counterpart does not.”
VI. ANALYSIS OF PAY-TO-STAY LEGISLATION IN NEW
YORK AND NEW JERSEY
A. New York’s Madoff Bill
1. Assessment of Madoff Bill
The Madoff Bill’s provision of a payment schedule creates a strong
response to the typical criticisms of many pay-to-stay statutes. First, as
197

Id.
Id.
199
Santa Ana explains on its website that the pay-to-stay jail “is pleased to host a full
range of alternatives to traditional incarceration.” Robert Weisberg, Commentary, Pay-ToStay in California Jails and the Value of Systemic Self-Embarrassment, 106 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 55, 55 (2007).
200
Id. at 62.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 63.
203
Laurie L. Levenson & Mary Gordon, Commentary, The Dirty Little Secrets About
Pay-To-Stay, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 67, 67 (2007).
204
Buchanan, supra note 156, at 66.
198
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drafted, this bill meets the concerns of many opponents who argue that
pay-to-stay programs are not rehabilitative, and that poor inmates will
not have the funds to pay for the costs of their incarceration. The bill’s
justification clearly states that the statute is intended to target those with
the means to pay for the costs of their incarceration, and not every
205
inmate of the New York Correctional System. It is intended to target
“well-off criminals” who are able to return to their “opulent lifestyles”
206
after their release. Although the schedule provides for inmates with
total assets of $40,000 or greater to be charged for a percentage of the
cost of their incarceration, and not only those who are extremely
wealthy, the varied percentages of the fee owed recognize that imposing
the same fee on all inmates would disproportionately burden those with
lower incomes. The schedule instead attempts to impose a fair and
appropriate fee for each inmate by considering the amount of his or her
total assets in calculating the amount due.
Second, the Madoff Bill withstands the criticism that pay-to-stay
programs burden the wrong people. The Madoff Bill authorizes the
Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations in order to
implement the bill; it does not strictly authorize a deduction from
207
inmate accounts. If such deductions were to be authorized by the rules
and regulations, the inmate’s assets would first be assessed in order to
determine whether they were subject to any deduction at all. Therefore,
this bill does not burden anyone without a determination that they have
208
the ability to pay, as defined by the statute. In addition, the fact that
mortgage payments, homes, home equity, and child support are all
protected highlight the fact that this bill does not look to burden the
209
families of the inmates.
Third, in response to the criticism that pay-to-stay fees are difficult
to collect, the Madoff Bill’s schedule creates a system where fees are
210
only imposed when they are likely to be collected. This is an
205
Assemb. 09055, 232nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=+A09055%09%09&Memo=Y.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id.; Stephey, supra note 121.
210
This schedule would look to the inmate’s total assets to determine their liability to
the state Department of Corrections: “[a]n inmate with total assets of two hundred thousand
dollars or more, one hundred percent of such expense,” “[a]n inmate with total assets of one
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extremely important aspect of the bill, as it looks at the obligations and
financial situation of each individual inmate, rather than imposing the
211
same fee on all inmates. This would likely prevent the waste of
administrative costs incurred by seeking to collect from inmates who
are unable to pay at all, or seeking too high of a fee from inmates who
could afford to pay only a part of the cost of their incarceration.
Fourth, the Madoff Bill is pleasing to proponents and taxpayers, as
it seeks to “hold criminals accountable while taking the fiscal burden
212
off. . . taxpayers.” This represents an imposition of personal financial
responsibility on those who can afford to repay the government and
taxpayers for the cost of their incarceration. Allowing the government
and the taxpayers to shoulder the burden where the inmate is financially
able to do so creates an inequitable result. Moreover, the Madoff Bill
requires payment and is not an optional or alternative program like the
California pay-to-stay programs. As the Madoff Bill does not reward the
ability to pay with access to a better correctional facility, this avoids any
potential equal protection concerns as there may be with the California
pay-to-stay program, where individuals are able to pay in order to serve
their time in a safer, cleaner, and less crowded facility.
The Madoff Bill has the potential to be very successful in New
York State. The total cost per inmate in New York is over $40,000, the
213
third highest in the country. Although the total inmate population of
the New York State Department of Correctional Services declined from
214
215
63,303 on January 1, 2007, to 62,598 on January 1, 2008, the State
hundred sixty thousand dollars or more but less than two hundred thousand dollars, eighty
percent of such expense,” “[a]n inmate with total assets of one hundred twenty thousand
dollars or more but less than one hundred sixty thousand dollars, sixty percent of such
expense,” “[a]n inmate with total assets of eighty thousand dollars or more but less than
eighty thousand dollars, twenty percent of such expense,” “[a]n inmate with total assets of
forty thousand dollars or more but less than one hundred twenty thousand dollars, forty
percent of such expense,” and finally, “[a]n inmate with total assets of less than forty
thousand dollars, zero percent of such expense.” N.Y. Assemb. 09055.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Gramlich, supra note 20.
214
DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., STATE OF N.Y., HUB SYSTEM: PROFILE OF INMATE
POPULATION UNDER CUSTODY ON JANUARY 1, 2007 (2007) 10, available at
http://www.docs.state.ny.us/Research/Reports/2007/Hub_Report_2007.pdf.
215
DEP’T OF CORR. SERV., STATE OF N.Y., HUB SYSTEM: PROFILE OF INMATE
POPULATION UNDER CUSTODY ON JANUARY 1, 2008 (2008) 10, available at
http://www.docs.state.ny.us/Research/Reports/2008/Hub_Report_2008.pdf.
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still expends a large sum of money on corrections each year. The
Madoff Bill offers the State the opportunity to collect a significant
amount from its inmates. Since the number incarcerated is
approximately 62,000 people, and the annual cost of incarceration per
216
person is over $40,000, even a relatively modest collection rate would
yield a significant source of funding that could help to defray the
corrections expenditures of the State.
Although New York has already implemented drug courts and
community courts, it is important to note that the Madoff Bill would
work best in conjunction with these alternative sentencing programs.
These programs work to decrease the amount of money that the State
expends on incarceration by diverting certain inmates from serving time
in the corrections facilities. For those who are incarcerated, the Madoff
Bill would provide the State with a means to reduce the budget gap by
217
seeking reimbursement from certain inmates. Although the Madoff
Bill would not serve as a prophylactic measure for the budget problem
in New York, charging inmates for the cost of their incarceration would
serve as a source of income for the State to offset the budget deficit.
Further, funds raised under the bill could prevent the State from
resorting to additional measures in an effort to decrease the budget gap,
218
such as reducing the guard-to-inmate ratio. Many states are forced to
cut helpful and rehabilitative programs that are important to preventing
recidivism. For example, New York City had to end its substance-abuse
219
program for former offenders. The adoption of the Madoff Bill could
provide the funding necessary to maintain such rehabilitative programs,
which help to decrease the incarceration rate.
2. Suggested Amendments for Madoff Bill
The Madoff Bill could be amended to provide that in order to file a
claim, the Attorney General must have good cause to believe that the
inmate or former inmate has total assets of at least $40,000.. The
amendment could provide that in the alternative, the Attorney General
must have good cause to believe that the inmate or former inmate has
216

Gramlich, supra note 20.
New York currently has a $16 million budget gap and has formed plans to either
fully or partially close several corrections facilities. Gramlich, supra note 148.
218
Buchanan, supra note 156, at 60 (emphasis added).
219
Gramlich, supra note 20.
217
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the means to reimburse the state at least a certain percentage of the
220
221
amount that they will be assessed to owe. Missouri v. Peterson
demonstrates the constitutionality of such a provision, as Missouri has a
provision under the Missouri Inmate Reimbursement Act providing for
222
a similar condition precedent to filing an action against the inmate.
The addition of this type of provision to the Madoff Bill would prevent
frivolous filings by the Attorney General where recovery is unlikely.
Further, like other states, this bill could provide that the state first
seek to recover from the inmate’s accounts, and then authorize a judicial
223
proceeding in order to recover the remaining balance if there is one.
This would reduce administrative costs by preventing the State from
having to file a claim in instances where the inmate’s account has
sufficient funds to fulfill their obligation to the State, or where the
difference between the obligation and the amount of money in the
account would not justify further administrative costs through judicial
action.
Finally, the Madoff Bill could be amended to provide for a time
224
limit within which the State can seek recovery from former inmates.
This would ensure fairness to the inmates by preventing the State from
having a claim against earnings which are too far removed from the
time of their incarceration, and do not relate to the former inmate’s
ability to pay at the time of his incarceration.
B. New Jersey S. 579
1. Assessment of S. 579
The provisions of S. 579 provide a response to many of the typical
pay-to-stay criticisms. First, the proposed legislation neither burdens the
wrong people nor harms the rehabilitation of former inmates. In
addition, it does not attempt to collect fees from inmates who cannot
afford to reimburse the State. Section (1)(c) provides for an inquiry into
the individual inmate or former inmate, by looking at his assets,
220
See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.403(2) (LexisNexis 2009). See also MO. REV.
STAT. § 217.831 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-21-905 (2009).
221
Missouri v. Peterson, 253 S.W.3d 77, 77 (Mo. 2008).
222
MO. REV. STAT. § 217.831; Peterson, 253 S.W.3d at 80.
223
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.56 (LexisNexis 2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 979a
(2009).
224
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-85a (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-607 (2009).
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liabilities, and dependents, as described in the pre-sentencing report.
Further, section (1)(d) permits the Commissioner to waive or decrease
the fee if the inmate can demonstrate that his financial position has
changed and he is either unable to pay or the fee would “unduly burden
226
the inmate’s dependents.” The proposed statute reflects the concern
that individuals who are unable to pay, or for whom the obligation
might interfere with their rehabilitation, are not burdened.
Importantly, the statute also looks to ensure that the fines imposed
on inmates do not affect their dependents too harshly. These elements of
the statute are significant, as burdening individuals with obligations to
the State that they cannot reasonably fulfill may function to “force”
former inmates into criminal activity in order to fulfill their obligations.
The statute permits “[a]ny person affected in any manner, whether
directly or indirectly by any lien” to bring an action against the State
227
challenging the validity of the lien. This allows for either an inmate or
his dependents to challenge the lien if it is too significant of a burden.
These provisions work to ensure that only inmates who are able to pay
either the full cost of their incarceration, or a portion of it, are charged.
Second, this proposed legislation provides for a thorough, multistep collection method, silencing opponents’ criticisms that the fees are
too difficult to collect. The proposed legislation provides for a lien to be
entered upon the determination by the Commissioner that a fee should
228
be collected. Next, if the debt remains unpaid, then the Attorney
General may take further action, imposing a fee that, “in lieu of the
actual cost of collection may be [twenty percent] of the debt or $200,
229
whichever is greater.” This provision will bolster collection efforts
because it incentivizes payment before the Attorney General becomes
230
involved, thereby potentially decreasing the costs of administration.
Also, the fact that interest may be charged provides a further incentive
for former inmates to pay as quickly as possible once the lien has been
231
entered against them, and serves to defray the costs of administration.
225
S. 579(1)(c), 2010 Sess., 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010), available at http://www.njleg.
state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S1000/579_I1.PDF.
226
Id. at (2)(d) (emphasis added).
227
Id. at (2)(f).
228
Id. at (2)(a).
229
Id. at (2)(b).
230
Id.
231
S. 579(2)(b), 2010 Sess., 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010), available at
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Additionally, S. 579 provides that the funds recovered can be used
to fund substance abuse programs, due to the relationship between
232
substance abuse and crime. State Senator Beach has stated that since
“[m]any of those behind bars are there as a direct or indirect result of
drug abuse, and I believe that the money collected could be put to better
use to help fund substance abuse programs that may help decrease the
233
rate of recidivism.” This is an important provision of the bill, as it
could potentially prevent the State from being forced to cut
rehabilitative programs in light of increasing corrections expenditures,
234
or from taking other cost-reducing measures discussed above. Further,
costs of incarceration would be indirectly reduced through the substance
abuse programs, as they target reducing recidivism.
S. 579 has the potential to raise a significant amount of revenue in
235
New Jersey. The cost of incarceration per inmate per year in New
236
Jersey is over $38,700 per year. The total number of residents in New
Jersey state correctional institutions and satellites totaled 25,436 as of
237
January 1, 2009. This figure includes 4235 individuals who are in
238
youth facilities and 2579 who are in halfway houses. S. 579 would
require those who are in halfway houses to pay for the cost of their
239
incarceration, if it is determined that they are financially able.
As with New York’s Madoff Bill, due to the high cost of
incarceration and the large number of people incarcerated within the
State, even a low or moderate rate of collection would produce a
significant sum of money that could be used for drug and alcohol
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S1000/579_I1.PDF.
232
Id. at (1)(e).
233
Beach & Holzapfel, supra note 139.
234
See supra Part V.
235
Based on the average stay per inmate, the Department of Corrections found that “[i]f
this legislation were enacted, approximately $1,090,488,000 could potentially be generated
in revenue.” N.J. DEP’T OF CORR., FISCAL REPORT, S. 2809, 213th Leg., Reg. Sess., available
at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2008/Bills/S3000/2809_F1.PDF. The report opines that “only
a negligible amount” would be collected. Id. Pay-to-stay programs have achieved great
success in many states in which they are implemented. See supra Part III.A.
236
N.J. S. 579.
237
N.J. DEP’T OF CORR., OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS REPORT ON JAN. 1, 2009 (2009) 5,
available at http://www.state.nj.us/corrections/pdf/offender_statistics/2009/WholeDoc_Off_
Char2009.pdf.
238
Id.
239
S. 2809, 2009 Sess., 213th Leg. (N.J. 2009), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us
/2008/Bills/S3000/2809_I1.PDF.
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programs, or possibly to offset high corrections expenditures.
2. Suggested Amendments for S. 579
One suggestion for S. 579 is an amendment to provide a payment
schedule similar to that in the Madoff Bill. This would provide for an
effective and efficient method for determining the amount of the lien to
be entered against each individual. A payment schedule that provides
for different percentages owed depending on the inmate or former
inmate’s financial status may actually increase recovery and decrease
administrative costs, as the amounts owed by individuals would be a
reflection of what could reasonably be obtained from those persons,
rather than seeking recovery in full or not seeking recovery at all.
Further, a condition precedent to filing a claim requiring good
cause to believe that the individual has a certain amount of assets or the
ability to pay a certain percentage of the cost of his incarceration could
be included. This would reduce administrative costs by only allowing
the State to seek reimbursement where it is likely to recover at least a
240
significant portion of the inmate’s costs. Finally, a provision limiting
the time within which the Attorney General may file a lien could be
added to ensure that the amount sought is reasonable in relation to the
former inmate’s financial position at the time of their incarceration, and
does not allow the State to have a claim against assets that were
obtained too far into the future after the inmate’s incarceration.
VII. CONCLUSION
Both the Madoff Bill in New York, and S. 579 in New Jersey,
should be adopted. The practice of charging inmates for their
incarceration, provided that there is an inquiry into their individual
ability to pay, is an answer to the problem of high rates of incarceration
paired with declining corrections budgets that faces many states
currently. Both New York and New Jersey are faced with high costs of
incarceration; the proposed legislation could defray some of these costs
while also promoting personal responsibility where an individual has
sufficient means such that the state should not be faced with shouldering
the burden of the cost of their incarceration. These programs have the

240

See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 800.403(2) (LexisNexis 2009). See also MO. REV.
STAT. § 217.831 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-21-905 (2009).
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potential to provide a significant source of funds to states, but also must
be used in conjunction with other alternative methods that seek to
decrease the rate of incarceration.

